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ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE
PROPOSED HAGUE JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
THOMAS E. VANDERBLOEMEN
INTRODUCTION
On September 25, 2000, a Manhattan jury in federal court
ordered former Bosnian Serb wartime leader Radovan Karadzic to
pay $4.5 billion in damages to victims of war crimes committed in the
1
early 1990s war in the former Yugoslavia. A few weeks earlier,
another New York jury rendered a judgment against Karadzic for
$745 million in a lawsuit focusing on crimes against women in the
war.2 Despite the seriousness of the cases and the size of the
judgments, the plaintiffs may never collect even a portion of the
judgments because of the difficulty of enforcement in foreign
countries, where Karadzic is more likely to have his assets. While one
of the plaintiffs explained that the verdict was less about money and
more about exposing the atrocities of the war, other similar
judgments have been only symbolic gestures as well, because
plaintiffs were unable to collect.3
One of the impediments preventing the Karadzic plaintiffs from
collecting is the probability that many foreign countries where
Karadzic might have assets would refuse to recognize or enforce the
4
judgments. While the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution requires that judgments rendered in one state be

1. See David Rohde, Jury in New York Orders Bosnian Serb to Pay Billions, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2000, at A10.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Edward A. Amley, Note, Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting § 1350 Judgments
Abroad, 107 YALE L.J. 2177, 2178 (1998) (discussing the procedural hurdles in bringing a
section 1350 claim and the difficulty in collecting on such a judgment if liability is found).
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enforceable in any other state of the Union,5 the United States is
party to no international agreement with a similar provision allowing
the automatic enforcement and recognition of judgments in foreign
6
courts.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is drafting
a convention that could change the outlook of future judgments
similar to those in the Karadzic cases. The proposed Hague
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in
7
Civil and Commercial Matters (“proposed convention”) would allow
the same kind of automatic recognition and enforcement of
judgments in courts of different countries that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause allows among the United States. The proposed
convention has a number of goals, including increasing the certainty
and reliability with which civil and commercial judgments will be
recognized and enforced around the world.8 As a result, it could
dramatically enhance the effectiveness of judgments by making them
enforceable in all of the countries who sign on.
The proposed convention, however, might be drafted in a way to
hinder cases like those against Karadzic. The cases against Karadzic
9
were based on the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a law as old as
the United States Constitution itself and the subject of much debate,
and the more recent Torture Victim Protection Act10 (TVPA). The
5. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).
6. See Maryellen Fullerton, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: The Global Challenge—
Introduction, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1998) (“The United States, in contrast, is not a party to
any international agreement governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments.”).
7. The convention is currently in preliminary draft form, as adopted by the Special
Commission on October 30, 1999 [hereinafter Proposed Convention]. This draft may be found
in American Law Institute, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Oct. 20, 1999), Hague Conference on Private
International Law, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter ALI Report].
8. See infra notes 76-79. Many believe that “the United States gives greater recognition
and enforcement to foreign judgments than foreign countries give to U.S. judgments,
[explaining in part why] the U.S. has something to gain from [such] a convention.” Michael
Traynor, An Introductory Framework for Analyzing the Proposed Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: U.S. and European
Perspectives, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 6 (2000). For other recent commentary on the
progress of the proposed convention, see generally Edward C.Y. Lau, Update on the Hague
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L &
COMP. L. 13 (2000).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
10. Id.
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proposed convention may hinder the ability of plaintiffs to use the
ATCA and the TVPA at all.
The proposed convention’s potential negative effect on ATCA
and TVPA litigation stems from its prohibition of certain “exorbitant
grounds” of jurisdiction often used by plaintiffs in these cases, namely
transient or “tag” jurisdiction. Transient or “tag” jurisdiction is
personal jurisdiction based solely on the physical presence of the
defendant in the territory, even if the presence is wholly unrelated to
the litigation in question.11 Because alleged human rights violators
often have no other contacts with the United States to maintain
jurisdiction, human rights litigants often rely upon tag jurisdiction in
the event the defendant happens to be physically present in the
territory.12 Prohibiting tag jurisdiction, therefore, might effectively
curtail ATCA and TVPA cases.
The current version of the proposed convention does contain an
exception protecting potential cases involving allegations of human
13
rights violations. Thus, the proposed convention, depending on how
it is interpreted, has the potential to have no effect on or to enhance
ATCA and TVPA cases. Even in its current form, however, the
proposed convention could negatively impact ATCA and TVPA
litigation. Moreover, the proposed convention is still being
negotiated, and a final draft could accept, reject, or modify the
prohibition on tag jurisdiction and the exception for human rights
cases.
Without commenting on the appropriateness of ATCA and
TVPA cases in the courts in the United States, Part I of this Note will
describe how the ATCA and TVPA operate and the problems
litigants face in enforcing their judgments. Part II will explain the
structure of the current draft of the proposed convention, and Part III
will analyze how the final draft of the proposed convention might
hinder, have no effect on, or advance ATCA and TVPA litigation in
the United States.

11. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. Forms of “exorbitant” jurisdiction used in
other countries, which could be useful to human rights litigants, might also be affected by the
proposed convention, such as the mere presence of the defendant’s property in the jurisdiction,
however unrelated to the litigation, or the nationality of the plaintiff. See infra note 120 and
accompanying text.
12. See infra note 60 (discussing the service of process on Radovan Karadzic when he was
present in New York on invitation from the United Nations).
13. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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I. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE TORTURE VICTIM
PROTECTION ACT
A. Use of the Acts in the Human Rights Context
The United States affords certain domestic rights of action for
persons claiming to be victims of human rights abuses, regardless of
where they occur. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) provides that
“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”14 The Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA), recently passed by Congress, provides that “[a]n individual
who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to that individual.”15
The ATCA, which traces its origins to the first Judiciary Act of
1789 but lay virtually unused for 200 years, has found new life as a
means for aliens to sue in U.S. federal courts for damages from
16
alleged human rights violations occurring around the world. The
ATCA was enacted along with the Judiciary Act of 1789 in part to
allow a forum in the United States for bringing pirates of the high
seas to justice.17 Others have viewed the legislative intent behind the
ATCA as being rooted in “what the Founders understood to be the
nation’s duty to propagate and enforce those international law rules
that directly regulated individual conduct.”18 In 1975, Judge Henry
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
15. Id. § 1350(2)(a)(1).
16. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge
of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 461-62 (1989).
17. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 814 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring). Another view on the legislative intent behind the ATCA is that of national
security: there was concern that refusing access to the courts to aliens could provoke
international hostility. See id. at 783-84 (Edwards, J., concurring) (quoting Alexander
Hamilton’s belief that “the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the
citizens of other countries are concerned,” for “[t]his is not less essential to the preservation of
the public faith, than to the security of the public tranquillity”). But see id. at 816, 821 (Bork, J.,
concurring) (expressing the view that concerns over national security warrant against hearing
ATCA cases). As the opinions in Tel-Oren demonstrate, there is no real consensus as to what
Congress meant to do in enacting the “legal Lohengrin.” See Jeffrey Rabkin, Note, Universal
Justice: The Role of Federal Courts in International Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2120,
2125-26 (1995) (discussing national security and other views on the legislative intent of the
ATCA).
18. Burley, supra note 16, at 475 (emphasis omitted); see also Rabkin, supra note 17, at
2126 (explaining Professor Burley’s observation on the ATCA’s legislative intent).
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Friendly discussed the ATCA and remarked that “[t]his old but little
used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us
since the first Judiciary Act . . . no one seems to know whence it
came.”19
Regardless of the debate about the origins of Judge Friendly’s
20
“legal Lohengrin,” plaintiffs have recently relied upon the ATCA as
a means of remedying violations of human rights around the world.21
For example, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,22 a Paraguayan citizen sued the
Inspector General of Police of Asuncion for kidnapping and torturing
to death his son, Joelito Filartiga.23 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the jurisdiction of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the
ATCA, even though both the plaintiff and the defendant were
Paraguayan and all of the relevant actions took place in Paraguay.24
“‘[I]nternational law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-avis their own governments,’ including the right to be free from
torture.”25 In holding that a United States court could hear claims
19. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (citation omitted). Initially,
Judge Friendly’s observation did little to clarify the ATCA for the author; the most I knew
about Lohengrin was that a march from the opera of the same name had been popularized as
the “Here Comes the Bride” song (though, incidentally, many Christian organists refuse to play
it, on account of its “pagan” origin). As it turns out, Lohengrin was a mythical figure from
German lore, a “knight in shining armor” who saved Elsa, a damsel in distress, by defeating the
evil Telramund at Antwerp. Lohengrin asked Elsa to marry him, but on the sole condition that
she never ask his name or his origin. Elsa popped the forbidden question and inquired into
Lohengrin’s roots, whereupon he upheld his end of the bargain and bid her farewell. A synopsis
of the opera by Wagner is available on the web page of the San Francisco Opera, A Look Back:
1996-1997—Synopsis, at http://www.slote-company.com/sfopera/lookback2/html/lohengrin.htm
(last visited Oct. 7, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
20. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015; see also M. O. Chibundu, Making Customary International
Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1069, 1096 (1999)
(agreeing that Judge Friendly’s observation remains as true today as when he wrote it).
21. For an extensive list of ATCA cases against nonstate defendants, see Deborah L.
Zimic, Foreign Sovereign Immunity—Exceptions to Foreign Sovereign Immunity—The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act Does Not Prohibit Invocation of the Alien Tort Claims Act to Exercise
Federal Court Jurisdiction over a Foreign Nation’s Non-Commercial Tort in Violation of
International Law, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 221, 223 n.9 (1987). Ironically, one of the few instances
before 1980 in which the ATCA (actually, a predecessor to it) was successfully invoked as a
ground of jurisdiction was in Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607), in which
a French citizen sought restitution for slaves taken from a Spanish ship seized at war. The
earlier use of the ATCA to protect a slaveholder’s “property” is ironic given the statute’s
current use to protect human rights.
22. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
23. See id. at 878.
24. See id. at 887.
25. Sung Teak Kim, Note, Adjudicating Violations of International Law: Defining the Scope
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regarding torts that violated international law, regardless of where
they occurred, the district court relied upon the doctrine of transitory
torts, which provides that “liability for certain tortious acts follow[s]
the tortfeasor, such that he could be subject to suit for th[ose] act[s] in
any forum.”26
The TVPA apparently endorsed Filartiga’s approach to the
27
ATCA. The TVPA was enacted in 1992, and its legislative history
indicates its drafters’ intent to address official, government28
sanctioned torture or extrajudicial killing. The TVPA is inherently
linked to the ATCA, and by no means was intended to replace it.29
Unlike the ATCA, the TVPA is not a jurisdictional statute. Thus, a
TVPA plaintiff must establish its jurisdiction via the ATCA, or
through some other means such as the general federal question
jurisdiction from section 1331.30
of Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute—Trajano v. Marcos, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 387, 392
(1994) (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885).
26. Id. The doctrine of transitory torts holds that a person may be liable in courts of any
country for an act wherever it is committed. See William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the
Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221,
234 n.95 (1996). Apart from the human rights context, it has been applied to other situations as
well. See, e.g., Darnell v. Rupplin, 371 S.E.2d 743, 745 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (alienation of
affections as a transitory tort), cited in Jennifer E. McDougal, Comment, Legislating Morality:
The Actions for Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation in North Carolina, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 163, 185 n.155 (1998); Peter Nicolas, Comment, The Use of Preclusion
Doctrine, Antisuit Injunctions, and Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals in Transnational
Intellectual Property Litigation, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 331, 354 (1999) (patent infringement as a
transitory tort).
27. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF
1991, S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 [hereinafter TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT] (discussing
the ATCA and Filartiga, and explaining that Filartiga “has met with general approval”); see also
David P. Kunstle, Note, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have Enforceable Rights and
Obligations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 319, 343 (1996)
(“[A]s indicated by both the language and the legislative history of the TVPA, congressional
reaction to Filartiga’s interpretation of the ATCA was anything but hostile.”).
28. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995); see also TORTURE VICTIM
PROTECTION ACT, supra note 27, at 3 (“The purpose of this legislation is to provide a Federal
cause of action against any individual who, under actual or apparent authority or under color of
law of any foreign nation, subjects any individual to torture or extrajudicial killing.”).
29. See TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT, supra note 27, at 3 (“The TVPA would
establish an unambiguous basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained
under an existing law, section 1350 . . . . Section 1350 has other important uses and should not be
replaced.”).
30. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246. Section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). As a point of
historical interest, “complete federal question jurisdiction” did not exist when the ATCA was
enacted in 1789 but only came along in 1875. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
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Litigants have recently invoked the ATCA and the TVPA to
attempt to vindicate human rights abuses abroad, perhaps most
31
notably in the case of Kadic v. Karadzic, the suit against Radovan
Karadzic, wartime leader of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb
republic, for various atrocities and brutal acts allegedly committed by
the Bosnian-Serb military forces.32 In Kadic, a three-judge panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
plaintiffs established the necessary federal subject matter jurisdiction
under the ATCA and had brought forth allegations that, if proven
true, could be remedied by the ATCA and the TVPA: “[The ATCA]
appears to provide a remedy for the appellants’ allegations of
violations related to genocide, war crimes, and official torture, and
the Torture Victim Act also appears to provide a remedy for their
allegations of official torture, [thus] their causes of action are
statutorily authorized.”33 The cases against Karadzic went back to
trial, resulting in over $5 billion in judgments being entered against
34
him.
Debate remains over the appropriateness of hearing these types
of human rights cases in American courts, especially in cases
involving foreign parties and acts that took place in foreign lands
35
seeming to have little connection to the United States. In the words
784 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
31. 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a district court could hear claims of torture
committed against Muslim women allegedly committed by Serbian troops); see also Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing a class action by Philippine nationals
against a former Philippine president’s estate for violations of human rights); In re Estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing an action
under ATCA by a Philippine citizen against the daughter of the former Philippine president,
claiming wrongful death of her Philippine son caused by torture); National Coalition Gov’t v.
Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying a motion to dismiss of an oil company
sued for violations of ATCA in connection with allegations of forced labor on a pipeline
project); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding damages under
ATCA and TVPA for violations of international law including summary execution or
“disappearance,” torture, arbitrary detention, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment).
32. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 237.
33. Id. at 246.
34. See Rohde, supra note 1, at A10.
35. See Conversation Between Thomas E. Vanderbloemen and Paul D. Carrington, Harry
R. Chadwick, Sr. Professor of Law, Duke University (Aug. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Carrington
Conversation]. First, there is a federalism concern that federal courts have no business hearing
cases that would otherwise, but for the ATCA, fall within the jurisdiction of the state courts, see
id., and that evolving notions of international human rights law should not be a part of federal
“law.” See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 776 F.2d 774, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J.,
concurring) (“Courts ought not to serve as debating clubs for professors willing to argue over
what is or what is not an accepted violation of the law of nations.”). Similarly, the belief also
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of Karadzic himself in a letter to United States District Judge Peter K.
Leisure, who presided over the billion dollar case, “Can you really
hope to find truth, or do justice, or protect rights of people in distant
nations? . . . Do you really believe that attaching a U.S. dollar sign to
human tragedy around the world by empty judgments in uncontested
lawsuits is a step toward peace or justice?”36 However, many view
these cases as wholly appropriate, as they often serve as the sole
means for exposing human rights violators, have significant deterrent
effects, and help the healing process of victims.37 For example, Judge
Leisure stressed that “[i]t’s very important that the United States of
America rises to the occasion when these things happen, and we not
just wait for the United Nations war crimes tribunal.”38
A number of barriers can impede litigants proceeding under the
ATCA and the TVPA. For example, the Foreign Sovereign
39
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) generally bars jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns in United States courts40 and can pose problems for
human rights litigants. However, the FSIA has been construed as
having exceptions allowing ATCA and TVPA suits against foreign
government officials who act beyond the scope of their power, for
example, by committing an act such as torture that a government
exists that these cases are a violation of separation of powers, because courts should not infer
that international law creates private rights of action. See id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). There
is a more general concern that these cases simply should not be heard by any American court
when they concern acts in foreign lands committed by and against foreigners. See TORTURE
VICTIM PROTECTION ACT, supra note 27, at 14 (minority views of Messrs. Simpson and
Grassley) (“[T]he United States is not the appropriate forum for a foreign national to hold a
foreign defendant to answer for action which occurred far from the United States.”).
36. Rohde, supra note 1, at A10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Karadzic is still at
large in Bosnia. He contested the court’s jurisdiction over him, but, upon losing on that issue,
declined to defend himself. See id.
37. See TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT, supra note 27, at 3-4 (“A state that practices
torture and summary execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law. Consequently, the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) is designed to respond to this situation by providing a
civil cause of action in U.S. courts for torture committed abroad.”); see also infra notes 68-69
and accompanying text (discussing the healing and deterrent effects of ATCA and TVPA
judgments). But cf. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 826 n.5 (Robb, J., concurring) (discussing how “[a]
plaintiff’s individual victory, if it entails embarrassing disclosures of this country’s approach to
the control of the terrorist phenomenon, may in fact be the collective’s defeat”).
38. Rohde, supra note 1, at A10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-11
(1994)).
40. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431, 443 (1989)
(holding that none of the exceptions to the FSIA allowed a court to hear claims against a
foreign state for the sinking of a private vessel by the Argentine military during the Falklands
War).
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would not publicly endorse.41 While the case law is by no means clear
cut,42 the exceptions are allowing victims of alleged human rights
abuses their day in American courts.43 Other hurdles, such as the Act
44
45
of State doctrine and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, can
also prevent ATCA and TVPA litigants from having their cases heard
in U.S. courts.46
B. Jurisdiction Under the ATCA and the TVPA
A striking aspect of the ATCA and the TVPA is that they can be
used in a U.S. court in a case involving a foreign plaintiff, a foreign
defendant, and activity that occurred outside the United States.47 In
41. See Kim, supra note 25, at 411. For a more elaborate discussion of how the FSIA and its
exceptions operate, especially in relation to ATCA and TVPA suits, see id. at 390 n.27.
42. See Michael Byers, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights by Jurgen
Brohmer (1997), 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 165, 167 (1998) (book review) (discussing the “complicated,
multijurisdictional, multilingual law of state immunity”); Rabkin, supra note 17, at 2136
(attempting to understand the “confusion” and “mess” of the ATCA, TVPA, and FSIA).
43. See Michael Byers, Decisions of British Courts During 1997, 68 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 302,
317 (1997) (reporting on the case of Propend Finance Party Ltd. v. Sing, [1997] T.L.R. 238
(C.A.), and explaining that the FSIA “has been interpreted as not applying to government
officials below the level of head of State, or as not applying to officials acting on their own
authority rather than on the authority of their State” (citation omitted)).
44. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (“‘[T]he courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory.’” (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897))).
45. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (explaining that a case may be
dismissed at the discretion of the trial court on the grounds of forum non conveniens if an
alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, and when the chosen location would
“‘establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s
convenience,’ or when the ‘chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting
the court’s own administrative and legal problems’” (quoting Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947))). Piper suggests, however, that ATCA cases might not be
completely in danger. For example, where a remedy in an alternative forum is “so clearly
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all,” an unfavorable change in law between
the forums would be relevant. Id. at 254. Similarly, “dismissal would not be appropriate where
the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.” Id. at 254
n.22. Keeping in mind the statement from the legislative history of the TVPA that “[a] state that
practices torture and summary execution is not one that adheres to the rule of law,” TORTURE
VICTIM PROTECTION ACT, supra note 27, at 3, dismissal of an ATCA or TVPA case on forum
non conveniens grounds in many instances would not be warranted according to Piper.
46. See Zimic, supra note 21, at 225 n.12 (discussing these and other hurdles). These
problems can be of equal concern in other countries. For example, in the United Kingdom,
human rights litigants can face similar issues with regard to forum non conveniens. See generally
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., INT’L L. ASS’N (BRITISH BRANCH), DRAFT REPORT ON CIVIL
ACTIONS IN THE ENGLISH COURT FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ABROAD 30-37
(2000) (on file with Duke Law Journal).
47. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Most Americans would
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U.S. courts, it is necessary for plaintiffs to establish that the court has
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, and that it has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.48 The methods by which plaintiffs
often obtain personal jurisdiction in ATCA and TVPA cases are
threatened by the proposed Hague Judgments Convention. Before
discussing these methods and how they might be affected by the
proposed convention, the subject matter jurisdiction of human rights
cases involving foreign acts and foreign parties must be clarified.
To establish subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that “three conditions are satisfied: (1) an
alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of
49
nations (i.e., international law).” In fact, the ATCA has been
interpreted as granting federal subject matter jurisdiction and
creating a cause of action when a plaintiff “can establish that the
abuses allegedly inflicted upon her constitute violations of
international law.”50 “[T]he torturer has become—like the pirate and
slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
51
mankind.” As a result, the United States can claim universal subject
matter jurisdiction for certain offenses “significant enough to threaten
the interests ‘of civilization everywhere.’”52 The notion of universal
probably be surprised to learn that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the
leader of the insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States District Court in Manhattan.”).
48. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999) (“Jurisdiction to resolve
cases on the merits requires both authority over the category of claim in suit (subject matter
jurisdiction) and authority over the parties (personal jurisdiction), so that the court’s decision
will bind them.”).
49. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238. Here we are talking about federal subject matter jurisdiction. Of
course, any state court whose subject matter jurisdiction included torts could entertain similar
human rights litigation. In fact, because in many instances the parties are all from foreign states,
with no one qualifying as a “citizen” of one of the United States, diversity jurisdiction would not
exist to give the federal court jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) (laying out the elements
of federal diversity jurisdiction). Thus, to get into federal court, the plaintiff would have to
establish federal subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA or under the general federal
question jurisdiction. See id. § 1331 (detailing the elements of federal subject matter
jurisdiction).
50. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (articulating the
belief that federal courts have jurisdiction in cases involving rights recognized by international
law). But cf. Kim, supra note 25, at 406 (approving of a court determination that the ATCA “‘is
simply a jurisdictional statute and creates no cause of action itself’” (quoting Trajano v. Marcos,
978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992))).
51. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
52. Kim, supra note 25, at 416 (quoting Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal
Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 60 (1981)).
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jurisdiction is based on the principle that states can claim jurisdiction
“‘to define and punish certain offenses recognized by the community
of nations as of universal concern,’ . . . even where no other
recognized basis of jurisdiction is present.”53
The use of this type of universal jurisdiction over violations of
54
human rights is not restricted to the United States. Many other
countries have created criminal penalties for human rights violators
and war criminals on the basis of treaty obligations, such as the 1948
55
Genocide Convention. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel,
Spain, and Switzerland, for example, have done their part
domestically to prosecute non-nationals for war crimes and violations
56
of human rights. One needs only to look at the current case against
former Chilean head of state Augusto Pinochet to note the worldwide
use of universal jurisdiction.57 While many of these examples of
universal jurisdiction apply to criminal prosecutions, other countries
have applied these principles in civil cases in the same spirit as the
ATCA and the TVPA.58
Plaintiffs must establish a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction. In other words, the court must not only be able
to hear the type of claim presented, but the defendant must have a
59
sufficient relationship with the jurisdiction for the court to proceed.

53. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 n.7 (Edwards, J., concurring) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF
LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (REVISED) § 404 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1981) (citations
omitted)).
54. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law Working Document No.
117: Proposals of the Hague Conference and Their Effect on Efforts to Enforce International
Human Rights Through Adjudication (Nov. 1998), available at http://law.gov.au/publications/
haguepaper/attachc.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
55. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227. Article V of the Genocide Convention “requires contracting states to
enact domestic legislation to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide.”
Dubinsky, supra note 54.
56. See Dubinsky, supra note 54.
57. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2133-34 (1999).
58. See Dubinsky, supra note 54 (citing the examples of the United Kingdom and
Switzerland, and quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 404 cmt. b (1987), which states that “international law does not preclude
the application of non-criminal law on [the] basis [of universal interests]”); see also TORTURE
VICTIM PROTECTION ACT, supra note 27, at 4-5 (explaining that “[s]everal states have
established that the international law of human rights can be enforced on behalf of individuals
in their courts” and giving the examples of Belgium, Germany, and the Philippines, which were
mentioned by the United States in its Filartiga amicus brief).
59. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1999) (discussing the order
THE
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Personal jurisdiction over the defendants in a large number of
ATCA and TVPA cases is achieved via transient or “tag” jurisdiction,
that is, jurisdiction obtained by serving the defendant while he or she
60
is physically present within the United States. Many criticize the use
of personal jurisdiction based solely on the presence of the defendant
in the jurisdiction where the suit is brought.61 However, the Supreme
Court “has reaffirmed that such ‘transient jurisdiction’ is permissible,
even if the defendant is only in the state briefly or for reasons
unrelated to the litigation.”62 Because of the belief by many, especially
in other countries, that tag jurisdiction is unreasonable and should not
be allowed in the framework of the proposed convention,63 human
rights litigation relying on this and other similar methods may face
problems.
In addition to the procedural hurdles of the Act of State
doctrine, forum non conveniens, and the FSIA, litigants can also face
problems when attempting to tag defendants who are immune from
service of process. For example, individuals called into a jurisdiction
for the purposes of participating in litigation can be considered
immune from tag service, as may heads of state engaged in official
64
business. In fact, in Kadic, Radovan Karadzic claimed he was
65
immune from service of process as an invitee of the United Nations.
The court of appeals rejected Karadzic’s claim of immunity because it
appeared he was served outside of the United Nations Headquarters
District, because the Agreement Between the United Nations and the

in which a district court should address personal and subject matter jurisdiction).
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2) (authorizing personal service of process upon an individual
physically present in any judicial district of the United States); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,
237 (2d Cir. 1995) (involving personal jurisdiction obtained over the defendant by serving him
with process while present in Manhattan on an invitation from the United Nations); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and
served with process by an alien within our borders, § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction.”).
61. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.17 (2d ed. 1993) (explaining
that, under Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), personal jurisdiction must be consistent with
a “minimum contacts” test).
62. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 15 (3d ed.
1997) (citing Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990)).
63. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 89, 111-12 (1999).
64. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 248 (citing 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1076 (2d ed. 1987)).
65. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 247. Kadic relied on federal common law and on the provisions of
the Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations. See id. at 247-48.
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United States regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations did
not grant such an immunity to inivitees, and because he was not a
recognized head of state.66 Regardless of the decision in Kadic,
immunity from service of process could still create complications for
ATCA and TVPA litigants.
C. The Problems of Enforcing ATCA and TVPA Judgments
While the proposed convention has the potential to hinder
67
human rights litigation, it also has the prospect of assisting human
rights litigants if it would allow for more worldwide recognition of
ATCA and TVPA judgments. The process of bringing a case before a
neutral judge to explain the abuses one has suffered has been
described as a valuable part of a victim’s healing process.68
Furthermore, significant deterrent effects are created by judgments
69
rendered against defendants for violations of human rights. In many
ways, however, an airing of grievances and deterrence of future
violations may be the only realistic relief a plaintiff receives. Due to
the high likelihood that the defendants in ATCA and TVPA litigation
are foreign, any judgments obtained by plaintiffs are largely symbolic
unless they are recognized and enforced in the countries where the
defendants maintain assets.70 The proposed convention, which would
allow automatic enforcement and recognition of certain judgments in
the courts of all signatory states, would not only make the
psychological effect of having the world hear a victim’s case a more
effective part of the healing process, but it would greatly enhance the
chance that the judgment will be collected.71 Near-worldwide

66. See id. at 247-48.
67. This Note intends to discuss the potential impact of the proposed convention on cases
proceeding under the ATCA and the TVPA. The term “human rights litigation” therefore
refers to actions under the ATCA and the TVPA.
68. See Amley, supra note 4, at 2180.
69. Deterrent effects could be present especially when a government is indirectly
implicated through the actions of one of its officials. In the context of the Inter-American
Human Rights Court, “[t]he threat of negative publicity is a persuasive force which often
compels governments to comply with international human rights norms.” Jo M. Pasqualucci,
Provisional Measures in the Inter-American Human Rights System: An Innovative Development
in International Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 803, 807-08 (1993).
70. See Amley, supra note 4, at 2178 (discussing the need for ATCA judgments to be
enforced in foreign courts for potential human rights plaintiffs to have greater belief in the
ATCA and the TVPA).
71. See id. at 2208.
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recognition would also make it difficult for human rights violators to
shift assets from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.72
Despite the potential benefits of the proposed convention, as the
following part will illustrate, the results of the current negotiations at
the Hague could severely affect the use of the ATCA and the TVPA
73
by human rights litigants.
II. THE PROPOSED HAGUE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION
A. The Purposes and Benefits of the Proposed Convention
Within the United States, the limits of jurisdiction and the
enforcement and recognition of judgments from state to state are
dictated by the Due Process Clause74 and the Full Faith and Credit
75
Clause of the Constitution. Outside our borders, however, the
United States is currently not a party to any treaty, bilateral or
multilateral, governing jurisdiction or the enforcement and
recognition of judgments from country to country.76 Thus, one may
predict with some certainty that a judgment from North Carolina will
be enforced in South Carolina or California, but the same judgment
may be given no effect at all in Mexico or Germany.
The predictability gained from the Full Faith and Credit Clause
is an asset to those who use the courts in the United States, and a
Hague Judgments Convention could enhance the reliability and
72. See id. at 2209-10 (commenting that recognition of section 1350 judgments abroad
“dovetails with other items on today’s human rights agenda”).
73. Of course, even if the convention were to be drafted to allow for the maximum
enforcement of human rights judgments, it would still be limited to those countries that signed
the proposed convention. Having more jurisdictions where a judgment could be enforced is
certainly better for human rights litigants, but, given that many traditionally asset-sheltering
jurisdictions probably will not sign the proposed convention, the reality of enhanced monetary
recovery may still be elusive.
74. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Ronald A. Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction
and a Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 661, 664 (1999) (“No state or federal
court may exercise jurisdiction in a manner that would deny a defendant the fundamental rights
of due process.”).
75. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).
76. See Fullerton, supra note 6, at 2 (“The United States, in contrast, is not a party to any
international agreement governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments.”). On the
domestic front, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act is a uniform piece of
legislation adopted by at least 28 U.S. jurisdictions that allows recognition of foreign moneyjudgments in a manner similar to that of judgments from other states. See Traynor, supra note 8,
at 4.
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predictability of enforcement of decisions from courts around the
world.77 Reducing the phenomenon of forum-shopping, and
preventing discrimination against Americans subjected to “overlybroad assertions of jurisdiction by European countries” have also
been cited as advantages of the convention.78 The proposed
convention may even have the effect of cleaning up the “mess” of
79
U.S. domestic jurisdictional law.
The proposed Hague convention would obligate a contracting
state’s courts to observe certain rules for jurisdiction in civil and
commercial cases involving parties from the other contracting states,
and to recognize and enforce civil and commercial judgments
rendered by the courts of other contracting states as long as the
rendering court had observed the prescribed jurisdictional rules. The
current draft of the proposed convention would apply to “action[s] in
80
tort or delict,” as well as other civil and commercial matters. Thus,
77. Notably, since many foreign courts refuse to enforce or recognize judgments on the
ground that the jurisdiction asserted was too broad, a Hague Convention stating certain bases of
jurisdiction which, if found, would automatically require enforcement or recognition, could help
litigants going to foreign courts avoid invalidation. See Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends
and the International Order Begins: Interpreting the Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution
in Light of a Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61 ALB.
L. REV. 1237, 1238 (1998).
78. Id. at 1239; see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Editorial Comment, Forum Shopping,
Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and Related Tools of International Litigation, 91 AM.
J. INT’L L. 314, 314 (1997) (discussing forum shopping and the negotiation of the proposed
convention).
79. See Clermont, supra note 63, at 89 (1999) (“Ironically, this treaty would . . . provid[e]
the opportunity to untangle the jurisdictional law applied at home.”).
80. Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 10. Interestingly, human rights litigants could
face difficulty with the current version of Article 10, which states that a “plaintiff may bring an
action in tort or delict in the courts of the State” where the act or omission occurred, or where
the injury arose. Id. The human rights litigant seeking to make use of the ATCA or similar
legislation might not be unduly restricted if the tort action “could only be brought” where the
act or omission occurred or where the injury arose; psychological injuries can potentially arise
long after an act or omission, meaning that the location of the act or omission would not
necessarily have to be the location of the injury. However, Article 10 currently provides that
“[i]f an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the basis that the injury arose or may
occur there, those courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect of the injury that occurred or
may occur in that State, unless the injured person has his or her habitual residence in that
State.” Id. art. 10, § 4. Furthermore, if the plaintiff brings the case in the courts of the state
where the injury occurred, it must prove that the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that
the injury would arise there. See id. art. 10, § 1(b). Obviously, limitations on the forum of tort
cases could impact the usefulness of the doctrine of transitory torts in ATCA and TVPA cases.
See supra note 26 (outlining the doctrine of transitory torts). For the purposes of the current
discussion, however, this Note assumes that tort actions alleging violations of human rights,
particularly under the ATCA, the TVPA, and similar legislation, would be allowed by the
proposed convention.
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tort claims falling under the ATCA and the TVPA would come
within the scope of the proposed convention, unless it provides
otherwise.
Coupled with all of these benefits, however, is the potential for
significant impairment of U.S. laws used to attempt to remedy
violations of fundamental human rights. In the words of Professor
Paul Dubinsky in a paper on behalf of the International Association
of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) submitted to the Hague Conference
drafting the proposed convention, “The IADL asks that in
negotiating a convention on jurisdiction and recognition and
enforcement of judgments, the delegates of the Hague Conference do
so in a way that does not roll backwards the progress that
international human rights law has made in the last few decades.”81 A
brief look at the proposed convention will demonstrate why some are
concerned.
B. Formats for a Judgments Convention—Simple, Pure Double, and
Mixed Double
A variety of formats may be considered in drafting a jurisdiction
and judgments convention. On the one hand, two “simple”
conventions could be used—one to address solely jurisdiction, and
another to address solely the enforcement and recognition of
judgments. Because of the “symbiotic relationship . . . between
adjudicatory authority and enforcement of foreign judgments,”82 a
“double” convention addressing both jurisdiction and the recognition
83
and enforcement of judgments is desirable. A “pure” double
convention has two “lists” regarding jurisdiction—a required list and
a prohibited list.84 Under a pure double convention, a court in a
contracting state is required to hear a case based on a jurisdictional
81. See Dubinsky, supra note 54.
82. Arthur T. von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of
Recognition Conventions, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 18 (1998) (“[R]ecognition conventions
almost invariably impose a jurisdictional test.”).
83. Part of the desirability of a double convention lies in its fairness to both plaintiffs and
defendants. See id. at 24. Simple conventions regulating only enforcement and recognition often
are more advantageous to plaintiffs than to defendants. See id. (explaining that simple
conventions regulating only enforcement and recognition do not allow the defendant to know
with certainty where it could be sued, while they allow the plaintiff to know exactly where a
judgment can be enforced or recognized). As a result, a properly constructed simple convention
might actually be more beneficial to human rights advocates than a double convention, although
at the expense of discriminating against defendants in human rights cases.
84. See id. at 19.
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ground found on the “required” list but is barred from deciding a case
based on a jurisdictional ground found on the “prohibited” list.85 The
European Union’s Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the
86
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and the
87
related Lugano Convention operate as pure double conventions, at
least with regard to EU defendants.88
Despite the enhanced predictability that would result in
jurisdiction, enforcement, and recognition of judgments under a pure
double convention, the strict nature of pure double conventions often
presents difficulties for negotiators in deciding what to require and
89
what to prohibit. A more flexible approach that avoids some of these
problems, though at the expense of some of the predictability of a
jurisdiction convention, is the mixed double convention.90 A mixed
double convention contains a required list (a “white list”) and a
prohibited list (a “black list”) of jurisdictional bases similar to the
pure double convention, but also has a third “permitted” list (a “gray
list”).91 The permitted list would consist of jurisdictional grounds not
enumerated in the required or prohibited lists and would allow, but
not require, a contracting state’s court to exercise jurisdiction; neither
exercising nor failing to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant on a
“permitted” basis of jurisdiction would be a breach of the

85.

See id. Certain limited or “rare” exceptions might apply to this hard and fast rule. See

id.
86. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civic and Commercial
Matters, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
87. European Free Trade Association: Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9 [hereinafter Lugano
Convention].
88. See von Mehren, supra note 82, at 20.
89. See id. at 25-26 (discussing how insistence on acceptance of jurisdictional grounds,
coupled with differences in “social, sociological, political, and economic cultures,” can create
breakdowns in pure double convention negotiations).
90. I have chosen to use the terms simple, double, and mixed conventions, instead of the
occasionally used French-derived terms, “convention simple,” “convention double,” and
“convention mixte.” Id. at 18-19. While the terms I use may slightly differ in connotation from
the French, and may also sound like a tennis match (i.e., “mixed double convention”), I believe
that they are a little easier to work with for present purposes.
91. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111,
118-19 (1998) (using the “white,” “black,” and “gray” terminology, and describing a mixed
convention as a “crossbreed” between simple and double conventions); see also von Mehren,
supra note 82, at 26 (explaining, from a drafting and implementation standpoint, some of the
practical advantages of a mixed convention, which “divides jurisdictional bases—like Caesar’s
Gaul—into three parts: required, permitted, and prohibited”).
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convention.92 As a function of the “symbiotic relationship” between
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments, however,
the courts of the other contracting states would not be required to
enforce or recognize judgments rendered on the basis of these
“permitted” jurisdictional grounds.93
C. The Hague Convention in its Current Format
Those negotiating the proposed Hague Convention have opted
94
for the mixed double convention format. In the jurisdiction portion
of the proposed convention, Article 17 states that “[s]ubject to
Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, and 13 [the ‘required’ list], the Convention does
not prevent the application by Contracting States of rules of
jurisdiction under national law, provided that this is not prohibited
under Article 18.”95 In the recognition and enforcement portion of the
proposed convention, Article 24 provides that enforcement and
recognition under the convention “shall not apply to judgments based
on a ground of jurisdiction provided for by national law in accordance
96
with Article 17.” Otherwise, judgments rendered on required bases
of jurisdiction are recognized and enforced in contracting states,97 and
judgments rendered on prohibited bases of jurisdiction are not only
refused automatic recognition or enforcement in other contracting
states, but are per se violations of the convention by the contracting

92. The more flexible mixed convention would not require judges to apply one set of
jurisdictional rules for a case with domestic parties and another set when a party is foreign; the
burden would be on the plaintiff to choose a “sound, rather than marginal” ground of
jurisdiction, i.e., one from the required list, if it wanted to have the judgment automatically
enforced or recognized in other contracting states. Von Mehren, supra note 82, at 26-27
(discussing “two quite different [adjudicatory] regimes” that would result under a strict double
convention).
93. See id. at 26.
94. See ALI Report, supra note 7, at 9-10. The Working Group that emerged from the
proposal by the United States to develop the present convention “recognised that a simple
Convention . . . would be insufficient even though, in the wider context of the Conference . . . a
full double Convention would be too ambitious.” CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, INTERNATIONAL
JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, No. 18
(Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law Preliminary Document No. 7, Apr. 1997) (citations
omitted), available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
95. Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 17.
96. Id. art. 24.
97. See id. art. 25.

VANDERBLOEMEN.DOC

2000]

01/31/01 8:24 AM

THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION

935

state whose court obtained jurisdiction based on a prohibited
ground.98
The “black” list of prohibited grounds of jurisdiction in the
current draft includes jurisdiction “exercised by the courts of a
Contracting State on the basis solely of . . . the service of a writ upon
99
the defendant in that State.” In other words, the often controversial
ground of transient or “tag” jurisdiction is prohibited under the
proposed convention.100 Equally of interest in the current version’s
jurisdiction section is an express exception to the prohibited list for
actions alleging violation of human rights.101 As the following part
illustrates, these inclusions could impact ATCA and TVPA litigation.
III. ANALYSIS
The negotiators could arrive at a variety of possible outcomes
with regard to the convention and any human rights provisions it

98. See id. art. 26. Note that the proposed convention would apply to civil and commercial
suits (with some enumerated exceptions, such as wills, social security, and marital relations, see
id. art. 1, § 2), unless all of the parties before the court habitually reside in that state. See id. art.
2, § 1. Thus, when the parties are “purely domestic,” the convention’s jurisdictional white and
black lists do not apply. However, when one of the parties is foreign, whether or not habitually
resident in a contracting state, the convention’s jurisdictional white and black lists apply,
regardless of whether enforcement is sought outside of the country or not.
99. Id. art. 18.
100. See Clermont, supra note 63, at 111-12 (“[Tag jurisdiction] has long been the recipient
of criticism from academics and foreigners alike.”).
101. Article 18, section 3 of the current draft of the proposed convention reads:
Nothing in this Article shall prevent a court in a Contracting State from exercising
jurisdiction under national law in an action [seeking relief] [claiming damages] in
respect of conduct which constitutes—
[Variant One:
[a) genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime[, as defined in the Statute of
the International Criminal Court]; or]
[b) a serious crime against a natural person under international law; or]
[c) a grave violation against a natural person of non-derogable fundamental rights
established under international law, such as torture, slavery, forced labour and
disappeared persons].
[Subparagraphs [b) and] c) above apply only if the party seeking relief is exposed to a
risk of a denial of justice because proceedings in another State are not possible or
cannot reasonably be required.]
Variant Two:
a serious crime under international law, provided that this State has established its
criminal jurisdiction over that crime in accordance with an international treaty to
which it is a party and that the claim is for civil compensatory damages for death or
serious bodily injury arising from that crime.]
Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 18, § 3.
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might contain.102 The following sections seek to explain some of these
possible outcomes and to illustrate how each might affect the use of
the ATCA and the TVPA to remedy human rights violations abroad.
As a brief overview, first of all, if the proposed convention
retains its current format, it might not have a tremendous impact on
the ATCA and the TVPA, but depending on how it is interpreted in
the courts, it could limit, or enhance, this type of litigation. Second,
the negotiators could eliminate the human rights exception from the
proposed convention, which could effectively nullify human rights
legislation like the ATCA and the TVPA. On the other hand, the
absence of a human rights exception might not dampen human rights
litigation at all. Third, the proposed convention could be drafted to
make current human rights litigation more effective without
compromising concerns of due process and fairness to defendants by
effectively placing certain forms of otherwise exorbitant jurisdiction,
when used in a human rights context, on the white list of jurisdictional
grounds and requiring enforcement and recognition of judgments in
these circumstances.
Furthermore, the negotiators could consider steps that would
increase the eventual participation in the convention, which would
strengthen its ability to assist in enforcing human rights. Above all,
the negotiators should understand that the final version of the
proposed convention, in whatever form it takes, could significantly
impact international human rights litigation via the ATCA and the
103
TVPA.
A. The Convention Could Retain a Human Rights Exception to the
Jurisdictional Black List as in the Current Draft
As mentioned above, the current draft of the convention has an
exception to the prohibited list of jurisdictional bases for human
rights cases, effectively allowing a contracting state to exercise

102. At the time of publication of this Note, the Hague Conference had scheduled two
meetings to take place concerning the negotiation of the proposed convention, one to occur in
mid-2001, and the other to fall in late 2001 or early 2002. See Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on
Private International Law (Oct. 30, 1999), Hague Conference on Private International Law,
available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
103. See Dubinsky, supra note 54 (“Whether or not the Hague Conference is willing to
endorse such a role [of enforcing human rights] for national courts, it is crucial that it not stand
in the way of these efforts by its member states to implement their duties under human rights
treaties.”).

VANDERBLOEMEN.DOC

2000]

THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION

01/31/01 8:24 AM

937

jurisdiction over individuals on the basis of national law in human
rights cases.104 The jurisdictional exception for human rights cases is
important because tag jurisdiction is prohibited in all other cases to
105
which the proposed convention would apply. Apparently, concerns
have been raised in the negotiations about the application of the
convention to human rights litigation.106
Plaintiffs bringing civil actions in the United States based on the
107
ATCA and the TVPA frequently use tag jurisdiction, often because
there is no other way to gain jurisdiction—ATCA and TVPA
defendants are often citizens and residents of foreign countries and
have no substantial contacts or property in the United States.108 As a
result, if a defendant who does not have immunity or who has waived
it happens to come to the United States and is served with process,
jurisdiction has been gained.109
On the subject of enforcement and recognition of human rights
cases, however, the case is not as clear cut. The current draft of the
proposed convention simply states that the chapter on recognition
and enforcement “shall not apply to judgments based on a ground of
jurisdiction provided for by national law in accordance with Article
110
17.” Article 17, in turn, provides that “the Convention does not

104. See Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 18.
105. See id. art. 18, § 2(f).
106. See, e.g., Dubinsky, supra note 54 (submitted on behalf of the International Association
of Democratic Lawyers to the Special Commission to heighten awareness of the potential
application of the proposed convention to human rights litigation); see also CATHERINE
KESSEDJIAN, SYNTHESIS OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF MARCH 1998 ON
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL MATTERS, No. 67 n.53 (Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law Preliminary
Document No. 9 (July 1998)) (“Nowadays, [tag] jurisdiction seems to be used to attempt to
obtain civil damages even where the victim [of a violation of human rights committed abroad]
does not reside in the country in which the court exercises jurisdiction. It is not clear that such
actions are covered by the Convention.”), available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/
jdgm.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
107. See Clermont, supra note 63, at 112.
108. Plaintiffs have a due process right to have their claims heard, and under current
Supreme Court doctrine, tag jurisdiction is allowed to satisfy this right. See Harold G. Maier, A
Hague Conference Judgments Convention and United States Courts: A Problem and a Possibility,
61 ALB. L. REV. 1207, 1235-36 (1998) (arguing that reasonable, permissive rules allowing tag
jurisdiction would align with the Supreme Court’s attitude towards jurisdictional rules).
109. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (regarding the use of tag jurisdiction in
specific ATCA and TVPA cases).
110. Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 24 (Chapter 3—the chapter on recognition and
enforcement—does not apply to judgments based on a “non-white list” ground of jurisdiction
provided for by national law.).
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prevent the application by Contracting States of rules of jurisdiction
under national law, provided that this is not prohibited under Article
18.”111 What this all means, considering the human rights exception to
Article 18, is that contracting states can always exercise jurisdiction
on an otherwise prohibited ground of jurisdiction in a human rights
case, but that the other contracting states are under no affirmative
obligation to enforce or recognize the judgments in these
circumstances. The current approach reflects the fundamental nature
of having a gray list; jurisdictional grounds on the gray list are
permitted but do not require enforcement and recognition in other
contracting states.112
The current version of the proposed convention would not
necessarily roll back domestic efforts at remedying human rights
violations but would just maintain the status quo of ATCA and
113
TVPA judgment enforcement and recognition abroad. It would not
allow these types of claims to have the routine enforcement in
contracting states that standard commercial judgments would enjoy
under the proposed convention.114 Practically speaking, the bottom
line is that the human rights exception of the current draft of the
convention would do nothing to increase the enforcement and
recognition of ATCA and TVPA judgments in contracting states.115
Similarly at issue is the future of other procedures used in foreign
116
countries that might be useful in the human rights context. For
111. Id. art. 17.
112. See von Mehren, supra note 82, at 26-27 (discussing the operation of the gray list in a
mixed convention).
113. This status is not all that good for human rights advocates. See Charles F. Marshall, Reframing the Alien Tort Act After Kadic v. Karadzic, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 591, 617
(1996) (explaining the current unlikelihood of having an ATCA judgment enforced or
recognized abroad).
114. Unless, of course, the jurisdiction were based on a required, “white list” ground of
jurisdiction, which seems unlikely given the practical realities of the ATCA and the TVPA.
115. In this sense, the human rights exception has taken what would otherwise be an
exorbitant basis for jurisdiction, and bumped it into the permitted list, demonstrating the
“crossbreed” nature of a mixed convention. See Juenger, supra note 91, at 118. When the human
rights exception to the prohibited list applies, the convention operates as a simple convention, a
treaty governing only recognition and enforcement, since exercise of jurisdiction on otherwise
prohibited grounds is not a breach. As noted elsewhere, this system has notable benefits in
terms of flexibility and application. See von Mehren, supra note 82, at 26-27.
116. See CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, NOTE ON PROVISIONAL AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES
IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW No. 5 (Hague Conference on
Private Int’l Law Preliminary Document No. 10, Oct. 1998) (explaining how the availability of
certain protective measures in foreign courts is a matter of interest to the Special Commission),
available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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example, English courts (and American courts as well) have
procedures for ordering the repatriation of a debtor’s assets from
other countries, a mechanism that applies to human rights litigants
and that might be affected by the outcome of the convention.117
Furthermore, English law provides that a defendant can be served
with an order even if he is physically located outside of the
jurisdiction, as long as the case has sufficient connection to the
English legal system.118 Professor Dubinsky explains that this leave to
serve a defendant exists in the case of a victim sustaining personal
119
injuries in violation of various human rights treaties. Furthermore, a
number of jurisdictional bases that made their way onto the black list,
grounds of jurisdiction based on the national laws of other contracting
states, could be similarly effective in exercising jurisdiction over
human rights defendants.120 Notably, the United States is not the only
country expressing some concern over the effect of the proposed
121
convention on human rights litigation.
The current form of the proposed convention arguably could still
help human rights litigation, or, alternatively, hurt it. On the one
hand, the prohibition on tag jurisdiction refers specifically to
“jurisdiction . . . on the basis solely of . . . the service of a writ upon
122
the defendant in that State.” Human rights litigation in the past may
have involved defendants who already had substantial ties to the
jurisdiction, such that personal jurisdiction would not be based
“solely” on the service of a writ. For example, in Filartiga, the

117. See id. at No. 23.
118. See id. at No. 27.
119. See Dubinsky, supra note 54.
120. For example, Article 14 of the French Civil Code grants jurisdiction on practically any
action brought by a French citizen, regardless of the connection of the suit to France. See
Clermont, supra note 63, at 92 (citing C. CIV. arts. 14-15 (Fr.)). Similarly, in Germany, the
presence of a defendant’s property, even of insignificant value, can serve as a basis for
jurisdiction over the defendant on claims unrelated to the property. See RUDOLF B.
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXTS-MATERIALS 242 (6th ed. 1998). The
current version of the list of prohibited grounds of jurisdiction includes both the French and the
German examples. See Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 18, § 2(a)-(b).
121. See, e.g., Attorney General’s Department, International Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil Matters: Draft Hague Convention
Issues Paper (1999) (asking for views on whether Australia should support jurisdiction
provisions in the convention that would affect tag jurisdiction and whether it should support the
inclusion of a human rights provision), available at http://law.gov.au/publications/haguepaper
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter International Jurisdiction Paper].
122. Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 18, § 2(f).
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defendant resided in New York at the time he was served.123 Other
human rights defendants may have engaged in conduct that had
enough impact in the United States such that minimum contacts with
the jurisdiction can be established. Assuming this were the case, and
that jurisdiction in a human rights case could actually be based upon a
white list ground, the proposed convention would require any
judgment rendered to be enforced and recognized in all of the other
contracting states. Additionally, an increased likelihood of
enforcement and recognition abroad could result from the
phenomenon present in mixed conventions that plaintiffs tend to
make sure jurisdiction is based on a well-founded ground of
jurisdiction to ensure enforcement.124
On the other hand, even in its current format the proposed
convention could hinder human rights litigation. For example, a judge
might read the human rights exception too narrowly and hold that the
proposed convention prohibits the court from having jurisdiction in
cases of tag or other exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction. As a result, in
cases where domestic law would otherwise allow personal
jurisdiction, if the facts were believed to put the case outside of a
narrowly read human rights exception, the court would feel obligated
by the proposed convention to dismiss. Of course, there is the
potential for the alternative problem: judges might read the human
rights exception too broadly by regarding an ordinary tort as a
125
“serious crime against a natural person under international law”
and subject residents of contracting states to exorbitant grounds of
jurisdiction where the proposed convention would otherwise prohibit
it. Given these considerations, the current form of the proposed
convention, even with its human rights exception, could affect ATCA
and TVPA litigation.126

123. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980).
124. See supra note 92 (explaining that the plaintiff must choose a “sound, rather than
marginal” ground of jurisdiction, i.e., one from the required list, if it wanted to have the
judgment automatically enforced or recognized in other contracting states); see also von
Mehren, supra note 82, at 26-27 (discussing “two quite different regimes” that would result
under a strict double convention).
125. Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 18, § 3.
126. An important additional consideration is that the Brussels and Lugano Conventions
benefit from the ultimate interpretation of a single tribunal, namely the European Court of
Justice, while the proposed convention would have no way to impose uniformity of
interpretation, potentially exacerbating the problem of defining “human rights cases” too
conservatively or liberally. See Traynor, supra note 8, at 6.

VANDERBLOEMEN.DOC

2000]

THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION

01/31/01 8:24 AM

941

B. The Convention Could Contain No Human Rights Exception at
All
It may seem odd that a convention regulating judgments and
jurisdiction could, by not even mentioning human rights, have any
127
impact on human rights enforcement. The proposed convention,
however, could significantly restrict use of the ATCA and the TVPA
even if the proposed convention does not mention human rights at all.
The prohibition on tag jurisdiction in the proposed convention is
what leads to the potentially destructive effect on the ACTA and the
128
TVPA. Without a human rights exception, not only would ATCA
and TVPA judgments based on tag or transient jurisdiction be barred
from enforcement or recognition in any contracting state, but the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would be a per se breach
of the convention, even if no foreign enforcement or recognition were
sought. Previously ATCA and TVPA-friendly foreign states129 which
ratified the convention would find themselves obligated to refuse
enforcement and recognition, and the United States would be in
breach if it allowed tag jurisdiction in ATCA and TVPA cases.130 In
short, the human rights exception currently in the proposed
convention does little if anything to increase human rights
enforcement abroad, but in some way serves as a safeguard to prevent
the ATCA and the TVPA from being rendered virtually useless.
However, the absence of a human rights exception might prevent
some of the negative consequences the exception could generate if it
were read too narrowly or broadly by the courts. In other words, if
there is no human rights exception, that exception could not be
abused in a way that would undermine some of the benefits of the
131
proposed convention. Additionally, jurisdiction in many human
rights cases can be based upon more than simple tagging,132 meaning

127. Cf. Amley, supra note 4, at 2210 (explaining that it is “not surprising” that overseas
validation of ATCA judgments is closely tied to “today’s human rights agenda”).
128. This is evident from the text of the proposed convention, without a human rights
exception. See supra note 101. Article 18, section 2(f) would prohibit tag jurisdiction in all cases
involving a nonresident. See Proposed Convention, supra note 7, arts. 2, § 1 and 18, § 2(f).
129. See Amley, supra note 4, at 2180 (analyzing the current structural, legal, and political
aspects of ATCA-friendly jurisdictions).
130. The proposed convention would by definition apply to the ATCA in most cases since
an alien would be involved. See Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 2, § 1.
131. See supra Part III.A.
132. For example, in the context of general civil and commercial matters, giving up tag
jurisdiction may not be that big of a deal. See Clermont, supra note 63, at 111-12 (“Given
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that even if there is no human rights exception in the proposed
convention, it might not roll back efforts at human rights enforcement
to the degree some would think.
C. The Convention Could Be Drafted to Allow Greater Enforcement
of Human Rights Judgments Without Compromising Due Process
for Defendants
The previous sections explained how the proposed convention
could be drafted so that it would not hinder ATCA and TVPA
133
actions. While it might alter the fundamental nature of the proposed
convention by making an affirmative statement, the proposed
convention could be drafted in a way to enhance human rights
litigation around the world. In short, the negotiators could include a
human rights exception in the enforcement and recognition of
judgments section, such that a judgment involving human rights
would have to be enforced and recognized in all contracting states,
even if the basis of jurisdiction was otherwise prohibited.134
Obviously, if ATCA and TVPA judgments rendered in the
United States were required to be enforced and recognized in all of
the other contracting states, human rights litigation would have a
much greater impact. In many ways, however, making enforcement
and recognition of human rights judgments mandatory presents some
problems with regard to the due process and fairness accorded to
defendants. Contracting states would have no assurance that the
judgment they were required to enforce and recognize was based on a
reasonable ground of jurisdiction. The only criterion a court would be
allowed to consider would be whether the case involved human
transient jurisdiction’s dubious propriety and general unnecessariness, the United States should
be, and seems to be, willing to accept the treaty’s prohibition.”). While human rights cases tend
to make use of tagging jurisdiction very frequently, they might not necessarily have to rely solely
on it as a means of obtaining jurisdiction. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text
(explaining how defendants in human rights cases may already have substantial ties to the
jurisdiction).
133. See Dubinsky, supra note 54 (explaining that the proposed convention should “not
stand in the way of these efforts by its member states to implement their duties under human
rights treaties”).
134. One place where this could be done is in Article 25 of the proposed convention, by
adding: “Any judgment regarding a violation of a fundamental human right shall be recognized
or enforced under this Chapter, regardless of whether the jurisdiction was obtained on the basis
of national law.” The human rights exception in the proposed convention also merely allows,
but does not require, a court to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of national law in a case
involving human rights. However, national laws still might require courts to have jurisdiction on
certain grounds not prohibited by the proposed convention.
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rights. In addition, this could lead to courts narrowly interpreting the
human rights exception in an effort to refuse enforcement of a
judgment perceived to have an unreasonable basis of jurisdiction.
A way to alleviate these problems, yet still retain some of the
advantages of a human rights provision in the enforcement and
recognition section, would be to require enforcement and recognition
of human rights cases like those based on the ATCA and the TVPA
not only when based upon the white list grounds of jurisdiction, but
also when based on selected grounds of jurisdiction, otherwise
deemed exorbitant, which have proven the most essential in human
rights litigation. For example, the proposed convention’s Article 25,
which explains which judgments “shall be recognised or enforced,”135
could provide that a judgment in a case where a plaintiff alleges a
violation of a fundamental human right, subject to the definition of
such a case already given in Article 18, shall be enforced or
recognized if based on a ground of jurisdiction provided for in
Articles 3 to 13 (the white list) or if based on the presence of the
defendant in the jurisdiction, the presence of property of the
defendant in the jurisdiction, or the nationality of the plaintiff.136
This alternative would make the proposed convention a much
more effective tool for human rights litigants but should help to avoid
concerns of overreaching and unreasonable assertions of jurisdiction.
First, by selecting only the most necessary forms of jurisdiction for
human rights litigation, the negotiators would be recognizing the
extreme difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction over human rights
violators, while stopping short of requiring courts to enforce and
recognize a judgment based on any exorbitant national ground of
jurisdiction. Second, courts would always have the safeguard of
recognizing that the case was not one alleging a violation of human
rights, depending on the broad or narrow reading of the term. In
other words, if a court felt that jurisdiction over a defendant was
unwarranted or unreasonable under the convention, it may be
because the activity did not amount to the level of a human rights
violation.137 The court would therefore be able to refuse recognition
135. Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 25, § 1.
136. These are simply examples of otherwise exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction that may
prove useful in the human rights context, given the difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction via the
grounds enumerated in the white list. See supra note 120 (providing examples of currently
blacklisted grounds of jurisdiction in use in France and Germany, which could be useful in a
human rights context).
137. Furthermore, it is important to remember that under the jurisdictional section of the
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and enforcement in “ordinary” tort cases based on exorbitant
grounds of jurisdiction.
Third, the proposed convention does contain an exception that
would give a court the right to deny recognition or enforcement for a
number of reasons, including if the “judgment results from
proceedings incompatible with fundamental principles of procedure
of the State addressed, including the right of each party to be heard
by an impartial and independent court,”138 if “the judgment was
139
obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure,” or if
“recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with
the public policy of the State addressed.”140 These provisions allow
some flexibility in the event a court felt uncomfortable automatically
enforcing or recognizing a somewhat suspect judgment.
Finally, an additional provision could be inserted into the
proposed convention requiring a plaintiff alleging a human rights
violation to post bond covering the costs incurred by the defendant
should the initial court decline jurisdiction or should any subsequent
court decline enforcement or recognition. This final recommendation
could quell fears that defendants in human rights cases were being
unfairly subjected to lawsuits and proceedings around the world.
If it seems radical to require enforcement and recognition of
human rights judgments on the basis of certain otherwise exorbitant
grounds of jurisdiction, it is in many ways the approach taken by the
European Union’s Brussels and Lugano Conventions with respect to
non-EU defendants. The Brussels and Lugano Conventions maintain
141
a required list and a prohibited list of grounds of jurisdiction but
have a “radical” and discriminatory effect on non-EU defendants.142
While jurisdiction can only be gained over defendants from EU
countries according to the required list, jurisdiction over non-EU
proposed convention, contracting states, because of the current exception for human rights
cases, are prohibited from using exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction in non–human rights cases
involving nonresidents. Thus, a country runs the risk of breaching the convention if its courts
are exercising jurisdiction exorbitantly in non–human rights cases. This result may explain in
part why courts might give a narrow reading to the human rights exception in the current form
of the proposed convention, see supra Part III.A, potentially undermining human rights
litigation.
138. Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 28, § 1(c).
139. Id. art. 28, § 1(e).
140. Id. art. 28, § 1(f).
141. There are, however, no permitted lists. When the conventions apply, jurisdiction is
either required or it is prohibited. See Clermont, supra note 63, at 93.
142. See von Mehren, supra note 82, at 20.
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defendants can be exercised on the basis of any national law, even if it
would otherwise fall within the prohibited list.143 The real bite,
however, and similarity to the proposal offered here, is that
judgments against non-EU defendants premised upon national law,
even if prohibited under the convention as to EU defendants, will
receive automatic enforcement in each Brussels/Lugano-convention144
contracting state. Furthermore, the enforcing court would not be
allowed an opportunity to review the jurisdiction of the rendering
court or to apply a public policy test, both of which are allowed when
145
the judgment concerns an EU defendant.
This version of a human rights exception to the proposed
convention, which would apply to the enforcement and recognition
section as well as the jurisdictional section, would operate with the
same Brussels and Lugano discriminatory effect, yet here it would be
aimed at human rights cases as opposed to non-EU defendant cases.
Not only would contracting states be allowed to use certain named,
otherwise exorbitant, grounds of jurisdiction in human rights cases,
but judgments rendered on this basis would receive automatic
recognition and enforcement in all contracting states.
Of course, the signatories of the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions may have had little reluctance in including the
discriminatory provision, simply because they knew it would never
apply to its own nationals as defendants. If the negotiators of the
proposed convention allowed such discrimination vis-à-vis human
rights defendants, some of the defendants could actually end up being
nationals of contracting states. In other words, if a country signs the
convention with the proposal, its own courts could be obligated to
enforce a human rights judgment rendered against one of its own
nationals in another country’s court on what might be viewed as an
exorbitant basis of jurisdiction, which might be an unrealistic
146
alternative.
143. See Brussels Convention, supra note 86, art. 4; Lugano Convention, supra note 87, art.
4. The current human rights provision in the proposed convention would have at least this effect
with regard to human rights cases, as opposed to non-EU defendants’ cases under the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions.
144. See Brussels Convention, supra note 86, arts. 26, 28; Lugano Convention, supra note 87,
arts. 26, 28.
145. See von Mehren, supra note 82, at 20-21.
146. It is also important to realize that a Brussels/Lugano-type discriminatory provision in
the proposed convention has the potential to backfire. For example, if one country agrees to the
use of such a discriminatory provision, but then disagrees with the terms of another provision in
the convention, it might feel compelled to choose between the lesser of two evils and join the
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This style of convention would have a major impact on the
147
enforcement of human rights. Countries might be reluctant to allow
so much use of jurisdictional laws from other nations in applying the
148
convention, thereby undermining the goal of predictability, but the
current draft of the proposed convention already does this to some
extent by allowing the exception in the jurisdictional section.149
Furthermore, jurisdiction based on national laws would be based only
on the specified, otherwise exorbitant, grounds of jurisdiction deemed
essential in human rights cases, a small subset of the total cases
brought, and thus might not really affect much of the predictability of
the convention at all.150 Second, the negotiators do not need to follow
the exact model of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions; the
proposed convention could allow contracting states who are asked to
recognize or enforce human rights judgments to review the grounds
of jurisdiction of the rendering court and to refuse recognition or
enforcement on public policy grounds, as is generally already allowed
under the current draft of the proposed convention.151
If anything, because many of the Hague Conference members
152
appear to be committed to the enforcement of human rights, the
small yet important number of human rights cases that would be
involved (coupled with the remaining and proposed protections for

convention even with the disagreeable provision, for fear that being outside of a convention
with a discriminatory provision would be even more undesirable. Though in a somewhat
different context, similar concerns were raised by the United States’ objections to an
International Criminal Court. See Norman Dorsen & Morton H. Halperin, Editorial, Justice
After Genocide, WASH. POST, May 13, 1998, at A17 (discussing President Clinton’s need to calm
fears of the U.S. military that the International Criminal Court might indict U.S. soldiers).
147. See Amley, supra note 4, at 2210 (discussing the importance of worldwide recognition
and enforcement of judgments to human rights efforts).
148. See KESSEDJIAN, supra note 106, at No. 102.
149. See Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 18, § 3.
150. Since expanded jurisdiction is permitted with all cases involving non-EU defendants
(not just human rights) in the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, applying it just to human rights
cases should not be a great concern.
151. The proposed convention stands in contrast to the Brussels and Lugano Conventions,
which disallow these challenges when non-EU defendant judgments are concerned. See von
Mehren, supra note 82, at 20-21. With regard to a public policy exception, see Proposed
Convention, supra note 7, art. 28, § 1(f) (allowing refusal of recognition or enforcement if it
would be “manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the State addressed”).
152. See Dubinsky, supra note 54 (noting the international community’s great interest in
Pinochet’s extradition and the willingness of Switzerland to locate and freeze his assets); Amley,
supra note 4, at 2196 (“[T]he international community appears to place a higher premium on
addressing human rights violations than it does on remedying contractual breaches and the
commission of traditional torts.”).
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defendants in these cases) would be well worth the great benefit of
enforcing human rights the world over.153 This version of a human
rights exception to the proposed convention allows the members of
the Hague Conference to recognize that human rights litigation relies
on certain grounds of jurisdiction that might otherwise be prohibited
by the proposed convention and that, in many instances, use of such
grounds may provide the only means of bringing human rights
violators to court.154 Modifying the current human rights exception in
this manner may be the necessary step in transforming what appeared
to be simply a judgments and jurisdiction convention into another
opportunity for the Hague Conference members to show their
support for the emerging enforcement of human rights.155
D. Increasing the Incentives to Participate While Enhancing Human
Rights Enforcement
If the previous alternative proves unacceptable, the proposed
convention could allow for a similar “Brussels/Lugano-type”
discriminatory effect, but on the basis of the defendant’s residence in
a noncontracting state. In the current version of the proposed
convention, Article 2 provides that the jurisdictional white and black
lists “shall apply in the courts of a Contracting State unless all the
153. There might be some U.S. constitutional problems with these proposals, since a U.S.
court might be asked to enforce a judgment that was based on an unconstitutional ground of
jurisdiction. See Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral Convention: The Lessons of
the Due Process Clause and the Brussels Convention, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 125, 126 (1998).
Concerns about the Constitution trumping treaty provisions is a major issue being discussed
with respect to the proposed convention. See Stanley E. Cox, Why Properly Construed Due
Process Limits on Personal Jurisdiction Must Always Trump Contrary Treaty Provisions, 61
ALB. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1998) (one of a series of articles submitted as a part of Albany Law
Review’s 1998 symposium entitled “Could a Treaty Trump Supreme Court Jurisdictional
Doctrine,” reprinted in Volume 61 of the Albany Law Review).
154. In fact, while many object to tag jurisdiction because of the lack of relation between the
defendant and the forum, one could argue that violation of fundamental human rights and of
the law of nations impacts forums around the world. While this is a potentially arrogant
argument, it was successful in Filartiga. See Kim, supra note 25 (discussing transitory torts and
the Filartiga court’s conclusion that “liability for certain tortious acts follow[s] the tortfeasor,
such that he could be subject to suit for [the acts] in any forum”); supra note 26 and
accompanying text (explaining the doctrine of transitory torts).
155. Instead of a human rights exception, one could go even a step further by putting a
human rights requirement on the white required list, such that jurisdiction would have to be
recognized if the claim was of a violation of fundamental human rights. Such a result is probably
not likely, because it would raise problems if judges felt it better to exercise discretion and
decline jurisdiction on forum non conveniens or political question grounds, but were not
allowed to because of the convention. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 63, at 118-19 (reviewing
arguments against forum non conveniens and, more broadly, discretionary jurisdiction).
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parties are habitually resident in that State,”156 and that the proposed
convention applies “to the recognition and enforcement in a
Contracting State of a judgment rendered in another Contracting
157
State.” The proposed convention therefore requires courts in
contracting states to apply the white list of jurisdictional grounds to
cases where at least one of the parties is not resident in that state,
even if that party is not from a contracting state. On the other hand,
residents of noncontracting states do not receive the benefit of the
prohibitions on blacklisted grounds of jurisdiction.158
Even though residents of noncontracting states can be subject to
the black list of prohibited jurisdictional grounds, the proposed
convention does not allow residents of contracting states to have
judgments against residents of noncontracting states based on the
blacklisted grounds automatically enforced and recognized in all
159
contracting states. In fact, the proposed convention does not allow
automatic enforcement and recognition of judgments against
noncontracting state defendants when jurisdiction is based on any
non-white ground.160
If the proposed convention opted for the framework of the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, it could require contracting states
to enforce and recognize judgments against noncontracting state
defendants, regardless of whether the jurisdiction was based on any
161
non-white ground or on the basis of national law. The ability of the
enforcing or recognizing court to review the jurisdiction of the
rendering court or to apply a public policy exception could be
162
retained.
Interestingly, the white list of jurisdictional grounds in the
proposed convention applies to all cases in contracting states
involving nonresidents, whether or not the nonresident is a resident
163
of a contracting state. The application of the convention to all

156. Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 2, § 1.
157. Id. art. 2, § 2.
158. See id. art. 18, § 1 (explaining that “[w]here the defendant is habitually resident in a
Contracting State, the application of a rule of jurisdiction provided for under the national law of
a Contracting State is prohibited if there is no substantial connection between that State and the
dispute,” and listing “[i]n particular” the black list of jurisdictional grounds).
159. See id. art. 24.
160. See id.
161. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 18, § 3.
163. See Proposed Convention, supra note 7, art. 2, § 1.
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foreigners might be intended to harmonize jurisdiction around the
world where foreign litigants are concerned, in order to protect all
foreign defendants.164 Contrary to the possible goals of harmonization
and protection of defendants, though, the current draft of the
proposed convention might actually undermine these efforts by
creating a free-rider problem. In other words, states considering
signature and ratification of the convention might realize that, even if
they do not sign the convention, their residents would still receive
some of the benefits of enhanced certainty regarding jurisdiction
within the contracting states.
Changing Article 2, section 1 to apply only to residents of
contracting states, however, could ensure greater participation in the
proposed convention, with a side effect being the increased
165
enforcement and recognition of ATCA and TVPA awards.
According to this change, residents of noncontracting states would
not get the benefit of the certainty created by the proposed
convention’s jurisdictional white list.166 In fact, an earlier version of
the proposed convention provided that the lists would apply “in
matters of jurisdiction . . . when the court seized is located in a
Contracting State and the defendant is domiciled (or has his habitual
167
residence) in a Contracting State.” Increasing the incentives to join
the convention could mean more participants.168 In turn, the more

164. See KESSEDJIAN, supra note 106, at No. 11 (“the defendant is at the Convention’s
centre of gravity”).
165. A revised Article 2, section 1 could read, “The provisions regarding jurisdiction in this
convention shall apply in the courts of a Contracting State if any of the parties involved is
habitually resident in a Contracting State.”
166. Contrary to Professor Clermont’s implication, the Brussels Convention, which does not
apply its jurisdictional requirements to defendants from noncontracting states, is not
discriminatory to outsiders because of this exclusion from the benefit of the jurisdictional lists.
See Clermont, supra note 63, at 93. This exclusion simply recognizes that the noncontracting
states were not present to negotiate the lists. Rather, it is the fact that judgments rendered
against defendants from noncontracting states are automatically enforceable in all of the
contracting states, regardless of the grounds of jurisdiction, that makes the Brussels Convention
discriminatory. This is because, as Professor von Mehren points out, “[w]here non-domiciliary
defendants are concerned, Brussels and Lugano function as simple or single conventions,” that
is, conventions dealing only with enforcement and recognition and not jurisdiction. von Mehren,
supra note 82, at 20.
167. Issues Paper Draft Hague Convention—Attachment A, Article 2, variant 3.1, available
at http://law.gov.au/publications/haguepaper/attacha.html#art2 (last visited Oct. 6, 2000) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
168. See KESSEDJIAN, supra note 116, at No. 11 (“This system could also encourage third
States to ratify the Convention.”); International Jurisdiction Paper, supra note 121, at 7.9 (“It
has been argued that . . . it should be left open to Contracting States to exercise jurisdiction
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participants there are in the convention, the more places there are
that a judgment can be enforced, whether a human rights case or any
other case for that matter.169
E. What If the United States Chooses Not to Be Part of the
Convention?
The foregoing discussion made two assumptions: that the
170
convention would be achieved and that the United States would
become a contracting state. But the United States, either at the
negotiating level or at home during a ratification process, could refuse
to join the convention.171 As the convention stands now, U.S.
abstention would not significantly hamper human rights efforts on the
domestic front, because, as noted above,172 the convention’s
jurisdictional human rights exception can be viewed as doing nothing
to advance or roll back U.S. efforts at human rights enforcement via
the ATCA and the TVPA. However, failure to join the contracting
states could conceivably be detrimental to U.S. efforts to have
judgments enforced abroad because of a perception by foreign courts
of a lack of cooperation by the United States. Furthermore, if the
negotiators were to adopt any of the geographically based
discriminatory effects described above173 and the United States were
an outsider to the final convention, then U.S. litigants could truly be
“whipsawed”174 in all areas of the law, not just human rights litigation.
Therefore, the United States needs to keep in mind that whatever
proposals are entertained and whether or not it becomes a party, it
has a substantial stake in the outcome of this convention.

according to their national laws against defendants habitually resident in non Contracting
States. This would encourage non Contracting States to join the Convention.”).
169. A recent report by the American Law Institute explained that the “provisions on
‘Scope of Application of the Convention’ (Art. 1 and 2) . . . may need further attention.” ALI
Report, supra note 7, at 10.
170. It is worth pointing out that, in light of the cited benefits of a judgments convention, see
supra notes 77-79, there is sufficient desire to make the convention a reality. But cf. Carrington
Conversation, supra note 35 (expressing the view that the regulation of jurisdiction,
enforcement, and recognition in U.S. state and federal courts is an inappropriate subject matter
for a treaty).
171. This would be particularly ironic, since the current convention was proposed by the
United States. See KESSEDJIAN, supra note 94, at No. 17.
172. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
174. Clermont, supra note 63, at 94 (explaining how the U.S. is treated under the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions).
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CONCLUSION
The process of negotiating a Hague jurisdiction and judgments
convention is a significant undertaking, and all parties involved
175
should be commended for the steps that have already been taken.
The benefits of a judgments convention have been well
176
documented. One of the potential consequences, apart from
possible constitutional conflicts and having to reorganize domestic
jurisdictional law,177 is the effect of the proposed convention on
domestic efforts to enforce human rights around the world, via the
ATCA, TVPA, and other similar legislation. The foregoing discussion
attempted to present some of the possible structures the final
convention could take, and the potential consequences these
structures could have on ATCA and TVPA actions, and on human
rights litigation in other parts of the world.
If anything, the negotiators should be aware that a project such
as the proposed convention, in whatever form it eventually takes,
could positively or negatively impact ATCA and TVPA litigation.
First of all, keeping a human rights provision as it appears in the
current draft of the proposed convention should not do anything to
adversely affect human rights litigation, but even then there is room
for argument that it could help or hurt. Second, if the proposed
convention removes its current human rights exception, it could
hinder human rights enforcement. On the other hand, the convention
could still be beneficial to human rights litigation in this form, since in
many ATCA cases one could claim that jurisdiction was based on
178
more than just a tagging basis. Finally, the proposed convention
could allow the automatic enforcement and recognition of judgments
in human rights cases when jurisdiction is based on an approved white
list ground, or when based on an approved ground that would be
exorbitant outside of a human rights setting. Furthermore, in many
ways independent of the use of a human provision, the proposed
convention could make its jurisdiction, enforcement, and recognition

175. See Brand, supra note 153, at 127 (forming the assumption that “[t]he parties
participating in the work of the Hague Conference . . . are ready and willing to try hard to make
a success of the negotiations, and are serious about the effort”).
176. See supra notes 77-79.
177. See supra notes 79, 153 and accompanying text.
178. See Clermont, supra note 63, at 111-12 (“Given transient jurisdiction’s dubious
propriety and general unnecessariness, the United States should be, and seems to be, willing to
accept the treaty’s prohibition.”).
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sections openly discriminatory to noncontracting states in the style of
the Brussels and Lugano conventions.
All of this being said, these are simply paths that the proposed
convention could follow. Perhaps none of these options will be the
exact direction the proposed convention should or will take. The
current version of the proposed convention, or even one without a
specific human rights exception, could arguably assist human rights
litigation. Furthermore, as a pragmatic matter, the potential for
backfire of a more aggressive Brussels/Lugano-type discriminatory
provision could break down agreement on the convention, making
introduction of such a provision undesirable. Above all, it is
important to remember Judge Robb’s comment in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan-Arab Republic,179 an ATCA case, that “[i]t is one thing for a
student note-writer to urge that courts accept the challenges involved.
It is an entirely different matter for a court to be asked to conduct
such a [highly-sensitive and political] hearing successfully. The
dangers are obvious.”180 The same is true for the negotiators. These
potential formats are easier said than done.
In the context of the implementation of the proposed
convention’s required, permitted, and prohibited lists, it is also worth
noting that there will be some variation in the interpretation of
whether a case actually falls within one list versus another. Justice
181
Marshall’s choice of words in Kulko v. Superior Court is all the
more relevant: “[F]ew answers will be written ‘in black and white.
The grays are dominant and even among them the shades are
182
innumerable.’” Furthermore, many are correct to highlight the
practical reality of underenforcement of human rights judgments in
the courts of the world.183 Additionally, there are always potential
problems with the enforcement of the convention itself, since states
often sign on to treaties with the best of intentions, only to breach
their terms when push comes to shove.184 However, “in an

179. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
180. Id. at 824 (Robb, J., concurring).
181. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
182. Id. at 92 (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
183. See Marshall, supra note 113, at 617 (reminding us that “[t]o this day, Dolly and Joel
Filartiga have not received a cent of their judgment against Pena”).
184. See RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 10
(1981) (suggesting that countries often view treaty obligations “more flexibly and in a broader
context than traditional legal analysis assumes”).
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interdependent world, most countries will often have little choice but,
sooner or later, to do business with each other.”185
The proposed Hague judgments convention provides a unique
opportunity for the members of the Hague Conference to rely upon
each other in an effort to overcome some of these very real problems
186
and difficulties. A district court acting with the endorsement of a
convention ratified by the United States and by nations from around
the world187 might feel more comfortable with the prospect of
handling political and sensitive cases, removing some of the resistance
that hinders the path to enforcement of human rights. Despite some
of these aspirations, this Note may provide at least a glimpse into the
implications that the proposed convention could have on human
rights litigation and assist the negotiators in deciding what course to
take.

185. Id. at 11.
186. The notion of there being strength in numbers is borne out by a parallel observation in
the context of the Inter-American human rights system that international tribunals often
alleviate the hesitation of individual countries to “point the finger” at human rights violators,
allowing the international community as a whole to condemn certain actions. See Pasqualucci,
supra note 69, at 807-08 (citing the specter of adverse international publicity as a motivation for
individual countries to protect against human rights violations).
187. Of course, as perhaps evidenced by the delays in the Hague Conference’s consideration
of the proposed convention, there is no certainty that the efforts of the negotiators will result in
a final convention that is signed and enters into force. In fact, the American Law Institute had
originally embarked upon two projects regarding the proposed convention—one drafting
implementing legislation if the proposed convention is adopted (“Plan A”) and another
proposing complementary legislation in the event the proposed convention is not adopted
(“Plan B”). See American L. Inst., Project on International Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Council Memorandum No. 2, at 1 (2000) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal). However, citing the “extended negotiations at the Hague” and the
“prospects for U.S. acceptance of a world-wide Convention continu[ing] to fade,” the American
Law Institute reporters have recommended putting Plan A on hold, and instead focusing on
Plan B. Id. at 2. Additionally, if adopted, there are considerable concerns that the proposed
convention could have tremendously negative consequences. Specifically, it might bind judges in
state and federal courts throughout the United States to recognize and enforce without question
judgments from other countries where the judgments met the basic jurisdictional requirements
of the convention even if the judges had serious doubts about the integrity and honesty of the
courts issuing the judgments. As noted earlier, however, the proposed convention currently has
provisions to deal with these concerns. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. If the
negotiators eventually arrive at an acceptable draft of the convention, this Note seeks only to
outline its potential impact on human rights litigation.

